Doctrine of command responsibility

Dear PAO,
My friend was apprehended for a crime. The apprehending officers allegedly extorted a certain amount from him in exchange for his freedom. My friend was released after paying the money, but he wants to file an appropriate criminal case against the members of the arresting team, including all of their officers. I told my friend that he cannot just implicate the officers of the arresting team since they were not directly involved in the anomalous act of their subordinates. My friend reasoned out that the officers are criminally liable because of the doctrine on «command responsibility.» May these officers be made criminally liable for the acts of their subordinates?
Tracy

Dear Tracy,
Generally, criminal liability only attaches to persons whose action or inaction, whether with intent or by negligence, is prohibited by law. As an exception, command responsibility may attach to an officer for crimes committed by his or her subordinate, subject to the conditions prescribed by law and jurisprudence. The foundation of this doctrine was laid in Rubrico, et al. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., GR 183871, Feb. 18, 2010, which was penned by Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr.:

«The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, 'command responsibility,' in its simplest terms, means the 'responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.' In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is 'an omission mode of individual criminal liability,' whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.»
There is no hard or fast rule governing the