The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

Dear PAO,

My uncle was hospitalized and underwent an operation. Unfortunately, he was paralyzed after the procedure. My aunt is unsure if there was negligence on the part of the surgeon. She is contemplating filing a complaint, but she is worried that she may not have any evidence to prove such negligence. Someone told her about the terminology of «res ipsa loquitur»; that the fact that my uncle was paralyzed after the procedure is, in itself, proof of negligence on the part of the surgeon. What does this terminology mean, and what are the requisites in order to apply it?

Cassie

Dear Cassie,

A thorough explanation of the legal doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur has been imparted by our Supreme Court in its Decision, as penned by then associate justice, who later became chief justice, and now executive secretary, Lucas Bersamin, in the case of Dr. Fernando Solidum v. People of the Philippines (GR 192123, March 10, 2014):

«Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as 'the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.' The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that 'where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.' It is simply 'a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.

»Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.

«Jarcia, Jr. v. People has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural